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I.

INTRODUCTION

On appeal, Podsaid sets forth eight assignments of e1Tor. Those assignments of error
included claims that the district court erred in Shoshone County Case No. CV-08-0807 by: (1)
failing to find the Board violated the statutory provisions related to termination or modification of
a guide license; (2) failing to find the Board violated Podsaid's due process rights in modifying
and terminating his guide license; (3) giving deference to the Board's interpretation of a contract
to which it was a paiiy; and (4) declaring the contract rights of Podsaid and the Board under the
disputed contract. Regarding Shoshone County Case No. CV-09-0440, Podsaid's assignments of
error included claims that the district court erred by: (1) affirming the Board's decision to treat the
renewal application as a new guide license application; (2) failing to find the Board improperly
processed Podsaid's license renewal request; and (3) failing to find the Board's licensure
examination process exceeded its statutory authority.
In its response brief, the Board contends all of the above issues are controlled by the
Board's interpretation of the settlement agreement it had with Podsaid from a prior matter. The
Board maintains on appeal that the district court did not eIT in giving the Board's interpretation of
its own contract deference. The Board maintains this Court must review the district comi's
decision for an abuse of discretion.
Statutes, rules, and the constitution determine the rights of a licensee in a contested case,
not the Board's interpretation of its o,vn contract. Further, the standard of review of the district
court's decision is not an abuse of discretion. Rather, it is the standards as set fmih in the
appellant's opening brief and reiterated in this reply.
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II.

ARGUMENT

The standard of review advanced by the Board on appeal is incorrect.

The Board claims that "[i]n reviewing the discretionary decision of a lower court, the
appellate court must review the lower court's decision for an abuse of discretion." Respondent's
Brief, p. 6. The Board cites to Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho
87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) to support this proposition. The Sun Valley Shopping Center
case involved the award of attorney fees as a sanction for a Rule 11 violation. This Court reviewed
the district court's decision in granting the attorney award for an abuse of discretion. This case is
inapplicable to the standard of review regarding contested agency action.
The standard of review for a district comi's decision on appeal of an agency action is not
an abuse of discretion standard. This Court has said it "reviews the agency's action independently
of the district comi." Dupont v. State Bd. of Land Commissioners, 134 Idaho 618, 621, 7 P.3d
1095, 1098 (2000). In Peckham v. Idaho State Bd. ofDentistry, 154 Idaho 846,303 P.3d 205, 210211 (2013), this Court held:
When reviewing a district court's decision in a petition for judicial review
under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, we examine the agency record
independently, but ultimately decide whether the district court correctly ruled on
the issues presented to it. See Two Jinn, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't. ofIns., 154 Idaho 1, 3,
293 P.3d 150, 152 (2013). An agency's final order must be affirmed unless the
appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced, LC.§ 67-5279(4);
Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 151 Idaho 228,232,254 P.3d 1224,
1228 (2011 ), and also that the final order is:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
LC. § 67-5279(3); Wheeler v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,
260,207 P.3d 988, 991 (2009).
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Thus, this Court independently reviews the agency record when determining whether the
district court correctly ruled on the issues presented to it.
B. The district court erred when it failed to find in Shoshone County Case No. CV-080807 that the Board violated the statutory provisions related to termination or
modification a license.
The Board does not dispute on appeal that Podsaid's existing guide license (as opposed to
his separate outfitter license) contained an expiration date of March 31, 2009. The Board does not
dispute on appeal it issued an order terminating Podsaid's guide license earlier than the expiration
date contained on the issued guide license.
Instead, the Board tries avoid addressing its failures to follow the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act by arguing it did not consider Podsaid's guide license addressed in Shoshone
County Case No. CV-08-807 a license of a continuing nature, and therefore the procedures dictated
by Title 67, Chapter 52, did not apply in this particular case. Response Br., p. 9. The Board
completely ignores LC. § 67-5254(1), which provides that "an agency shall not revoke, suspend,
modify, annul, withdraw or amend a license ... unless the agency first gives notice and an
opportunity for an appropriate contested case ... " This provision applies regardless of whether the
license is one of a continuing nature. The district court erred when it failed to find the agency
violated the statutory procedures in Chapter 67, Title 52, and the administrative rules of the Office
of the Attorney General when it terminated Podsaid's license.
Although the previous argument is dispositive, another matter of concern on rem.;tnd is the
Board's argument that the district court did not err when it affirmed the agency's interpretation of
its own contract with Podsaid. On appeal, Podsaid raised the issue that questions of contract
interpretation and enforcement are normally the sole province of the courts and not agencies. See
Lemhi Telephone Company v. A1ountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 98 Idaho 692, 696,
571 P.2d 753 (1977). The Board cites to no authority contrary to this holding.
3

The Board ignores the case law and argument presented by Podsaid in his opening brief
that the agency exceeded its powers when it interpreted its own contract and terminated his license
based on its own interpretation. Instead, the Board vehemently argues that its interpretation of the
contract met the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement. The Board interpretation of its
own contracts is not within the statutory powers granted to the Board.

Such issues are for

determination in a declaratory judgment action in which the court first determines if the contract
is vague or ambiguous, and if so, the intent of the parties is determined based upon facts presented
to the court or a jury. 1 The agency may not interpret and adjudicate its own contracts within an
agency setting and then claim deference for its own favorable interpretations. The district court
eITed when it deferred to the agency's adjudication of its own contractual rights.

C. Podsaid's appeal in Shoshone County Case No. CV-08-807 is not moot.
The Board claims in its response brief this appeal is moot because "in reality, Podsaid got
what he wanted regarding his guide license." Reply Br., p. 8. The Board argues that the district
court's temporary stay prevented the termination of Podsaid's guide license and allowed Podsaid
to guide through March 31, 2009. This argument ignores that guide licenses are a license of a
continuing nature, which attaches certain rights to the licensee in a renewal setting.
Instead, the Board argues this Court should ignore in this particular case that a guide license
is one of a continuing nature because of a statement made by Podsaid at the December 8, 2008,
hearing held following the termination of his guide license. The Board asks this Court on appeal
to interpret a quoted statement made by Podsaid at the hearing as an intentional waiver by Podsaid
of his right to claim that his guide license was one of a continuing nature. 2 The statement quoted

In this matter, the settlement agreement is not a model of clarity.
Interestingly, the exchange the Board relies upon was one initiated by the hearing officer, an individual who was
supposed to be an impartial officer to facilitate the hearing proceeding.
1

2
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by the Board in its response brief is taken out of context. At the hearing, the following exchange
occurred between the Hearing Officer (agency attorney Roger Hales) and Podsaid:
HEARING OFFICER:
For Sandy.
I've got one question, Mr. Podsaid: Is it your intent that if your license was
extended until March 31, 2009, that you're not desiring to renew it after that period
of time? I'm trying to understand your request.
MR. PODSAID:
I don't know. I honestly don't know. I have not given up the right to have
a guide license in this Stipulated Agreement, in my opinion. It was never in there
for that. I agreed I would sell.

807 R. p. 134, 11. (Tr. p. 38, 11. 4-12.)
Podsaid indicated following further inquiry by the hearing officer he was seeking at that

time to have his license continue to the existing expiration date rather than be terminated in
December, the action the Board had already taken. Nothing about this exchange indicated Podsaid
intended to waive his right to submit a guide license renewal. Podsaid did not unintentionally
forfeit his right to submit a guide license renewal at the expiration of his guide license as claimed
by the Board.

D. The Board action taken at the June 17, 2009, hearing was appealable in Shoshone
County Case No. CV-09-0440.
1. The Board took an action that was appealable.

In this appeal, the Board claims Podsaid improperly appealed a letter from the Board's
attorney and there was no Board action to appeal. As this Court may recall from Podsaid's opening
brief, the Board contends it administered a licensee "examination" of Podsaid on June 17, 2009,
to dete1mine his qualifications to hold a guide license. At the time of this licensing "examination",
the agency had a contested administrative complaint pending against Podsaid that alleged
Podsaid's internet advertising practices violated the Board's rules. Podsaid had moved to dismiss
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this administrative contested case for failure of the agency to follow the statute in filing it. The
Board proceeded no further on the contested internet advertising case after Podsaid filed his motion
to dismiss. It was still pending when the Board decided to "examine" Podsaid based upon his
license renewal application. Following this "examination", Podsaid's counsel received a letter
dated June 24, 2014, informing Podsaid that:
Please be advised the Board did convene the hearing at the time and date
set forth in its notice. During that hearing, it admitted into evidence various
documents regarding your client's guide application. After the hearing was closed
the Board made the following motion:
Motion was made to deny the new guide application for Sandy
Podsaid based upon his misleading advertising in violation of the
Board's laws and rules as established by the record of the hearing
before the Board on June 17, 2009, and further based upon his prior
discipline by the Board, and finally based upon the terms of the
settlement agreement between Mr. Podsaid and the Board approved
on August 10, 2007.

This motion was unanimously approved by the Board.
440 R. p. 210. (Emphasis added.)
It is disingenuous of the Board to now claim on appeal there was no Board action.

The Board does not deny on appeal that the Board's prosecutor presented evidence on the
contested internet advertising case to the Board on June 17, 2009, and advised the Board Podsaid
had violated the Board's rules. The Board does not deny on appeal that following the presentation
of the evidence by the Board's prosecutor that the Board voted not to issue Podsaid a guide license.
Instead, the Board argues that Podsaid's appeal is an appeal of the letter and not a final order or
action by the Board.
Agency action is defined in the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act as follows:
(a) The whole or part of a rule or order;
(b) The failure to issue a rule or order; or
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(c) An agency's performance of, or failure to perform, any duty placed on it by
law.
LC. § 67-5201(3).
The events of June 17, 2009, which were documented in the subsequent letter of June 24,
2009, constituted agency action on several levels. Idaho Code § 36-2109(c) provides in relevant
part: "If the [license] application is denied, the board shall notify the applicant, in writing, of the
reasons for such denial within ten (10) days and if the applicant shall correct, to the satisfaction of
the board, such reasons within thirty (30) days of receipt of such notice and if, thereafter, a majority
of the board concur, the board may issue a license to the applicant." The letter either fulfilled the
Board's requirement under this code section of informing Podsaid of the Board's action, or the
Board failed to infonn Podsaid of its license denial as required by the statute. Apparently the
Board is claiming on appeal it failed to notify Podsaid in writing of its denial of the license and
the reasons for the denial. Whether one looks at the letter as a performance of the Board's duty
imposed under LC. § 36-2109(c), or whether one deems the Board failed to perform the duty
imposed on it, there was agency action as defined above.
Next, the agency had a contested case pending which alleged advertising violations. It had
a duty to prosecute the pending contested case following the contested case rules and procedures.
It could not step outside the contested case it had initiated and ambush Podsaid at a "licensing

examination" with prosecution of the contested advertising case. The agency failed to meets its
duty to prosecute the advertising case following the rules and procedures for a contested case.
When a matter is not conducted as a contested case, a person aggrieved by an agency action may
petition for judicial review. LC.§ 67-5270(2); Laughy v. Idaho Department ofTransportation, 149
Idaho 867, 872, 243 P.3d 1055, 1060 (2010). Podsaid had a right to appeal the agency's action
of hearing and deciding the contested case in "licensing examination" under LC. § 67-5201(3).
7

2. The Board's action exceeded its statutory authority.
The Board's claim relied upon statutory authority to proceed as it did in the "licensing
examination" is unpersuasive. The Board claims its Executive Director had the right to defer the
decision on Podsaid's license renewal application to the Board based upon IDAPA
25.0l.01.064(d). This rule provides "[t]he Executive Director may defer granting or denying any
license or related matter to the Board for action by the Board." This code section does not provide
the Board may conduct a contested case hearing under the guise of an examination to determine
the skill of the person applying for the license.
The Board next claims I.C. § 36-2107 allowed it to proceed with the hearing as it did.
Idaho Code § 36-2107(a) gives the Board the duty and power "[t]o conduct examinations to
ascertain the qualifications of applicants for outfitter's or guide's licenses". The Board contends
this language gave it the statutory authority to hold a hearing and prosecute the alleged internet
advertising violation.
When construing a statute, the words used must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning, and the statute must be construed as a whole." Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360,365, 128
P .3d 897, 902 (2005) (citations omitted). Merriam-Webster defines "examination" to mean "a test
to show a person's progress, knowledge, or ability." 3 This definition does not encompass a hearing
to determine if a person has violated an agency rule. In fact, LC. § 36-2107 addresses when the
Board has the power to conduct a hearing. I.C. § 36-2107(c) gives the Board the power "[t]o
conduct hearings and proceedings to suspend, revoke or restrict the licenses of ... guides, and to
suspend, revoke or restrict said licenses for due cause in the manner hereinafter provided"

Merriam-Webster, examination, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/examination (accessed September
26, 2014).
3
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(emphasis added). The manner prescribed by LC. § 36-2114 requires the Board follow the
procedure provided in Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code.
The Board also contends that LC. § 36-2108(c) justified the "examination" hearing it
conducted. This code section allows the Board to conduct "additional investigation and inquiry
relative to the applicant and his qualifications." It does not allow the Board to conduct a hearing
on a pending contested case.
Finally, the Board claims it properly refused to issue Podsaid a license based upon LC. §
36-2109(c). The Board argues an administrative complaint was filed against Podsaid which
justified its denial of his license. This argument highlights the significance of Podsaid's appeal.
Even though Podsaid had answered the administrative complaint and moved to dismiss it,
the Board never took the administrative complaint to a contested case hearing. Podsaid never was
afforded the process to which he may defend against this administrative complaint. Instead, the
agency allowed the contested case to languish, and moved forward with a plan to waylay Podsaid
at a licensing "examination". This "examination" was not devised to test his skill as a guide.
Instead, it was a prosecution of the administrative complaint without providing Podsaid any of the
due process rights or statutory process to which he was entitled. It is clear from the letter denying
Podsaid his license that the Board determined he was guilty of the acts alleged in the administrative
complaint. The Board did not have the statutory authority as it argues to proceed in such a fashion.

3. Podsaid was entitled to a contested case hearing before the Board took action on
his renewal application.
The Board had to afford Podsaid a contested case hearing for the administrative complaint
it had filed regarding his alleged violations of its advertising rules.

In considering the

administrative complaint and the alleged advertising violations at the "licensing examination", the
Board was improperly advised by the prosecutor at the hearing on Podsaids rights:
9

Again, what's happening is here [at the licensing examination] we have notified
Mr. Podsaid that we were going to have this discussion. We've essentially given
him the opportunity to come and speak to you. What I would if you decide not
to grant the license, he still has an opportunity within 21 days to ask for a fonnal
contested hearing, and I would ask you to include that in your Order, so there's no
question that he does have that opportunity."
AR p. 28 (Tr. p. 26, L. 11-18.)
Not only did the Board owe Podsaid a contested hearing with respect to the pending license
proceeding. Since Podsaid's license was one of a continuing nature, the agency had a statutory
duty to follow the process regarding license renewals as specified in I.C. § 67-5254. This process
affords a licensee procedural due process. The Board does not deny it did not follow this statute.
Podsaid had a right to appeal pursuant to I.C. § 67-5201(3)(c) for the Board's failure to follow the
statutory duties imposed on it by I.C. § 67-5254. The agency eould not prosecute its case before
the Board, and only then afford Podsaid the rights and protections of a contested case. It could not
bypass the contested case procedures by allowing the administrative complaint it had filed to
languish, and prosecute the matter in a "licensing examination".
In its response, the Board excuses its failure to provide Podsaid with procedural due process
and a contested case hearing by claiming Podsaid' s license was not one of a continuing nature
even though he had held it since 1986, and the Board's own application recognized licensees could
submit renewal applications. The Board contends Podsaid's guide license did not qualify as one
of a continuing nature because the renewal application listed a different employing outfitter for the
upcoming year. The Board argues this disqualified the license from qualifying as one of continuing
nature. The Board cites no authority for the proposition that listing a new employing outfitter
disqualifies the license as one of a continuing nature.
Conversely, the Outfitters and Guides statute anticipates that most renewals will not be the
exact same as the previous year. Idaho Code 36-2109( d) reads:
10

No license shall be issued by the board until a majority thereof has reported
favorably thereon; except, an application for a license identical to a license held
during the previous year may be issued on approval by one (1) board member
providing there is no adverse information on file regarding the applicant.
(Emphasis added). This statute anticipates renewals will not be identical each year. If a renewal is
identical to the previous year's application, it is an exception and only one board member's
approval is needed for renewal. Similarly, no rules prevent a renewal application from including
different or new details. The guide must submit a license application on the form provided by the
board. LC. § 36-2108(a), IDAPA 25.01.01.013. To be licensed, a guide must be employed by a
licensed outfitter and his guiding privileges are restricted to the outfitter's operating areas. IDAP A
25.01.01.032. To constitute a complete guide application under the rules, the applicant must use
the form provided by the Board and it must contain an affidavit from the employing outfitter that
the guide will possess a valid first aid card before working and a signed certification from the
outfitter that the guide is qualified; has extensive firsthand knowledge of the operating area; ifland
based, understands maps and GPS systems and is clean and well mannered. IDAPA 25.01.01.
034. A guide license can be amended. IDAPA 25.01.01.015.05.d. Nothing in these rules suggests
that the change in an employing outfitter disqualifies the license as one of a continuing nature.
Further, the character of the license as a guide license did not change. Before the Board could
refuse to renew Podsaid's license, he was entitled to procedural due process and a contested case
hearing. Podsaid had a right to appeal the Board's failure to follow its statutory duty in processing
his license renewal.
The district court did not address this issue in its decision on appeal. Instead, the district
court found that the guide license terminated on December 30, 2008, and therefore, the application
was a new license application. The district court erred in this finding. Because an appeal was
pending in the 2008 case, LC. § 67-5254 required the agency to process Podsaid's renewal
11

application as a license of a continuing nature. The district court's pragmatic approach examined
the appeal based upon the district court's final determination in the 2008 case rather than the rights
Podsaid was entitled to at the time of submittal of the renewal application. It was error for the
district court to determine Podsaid's rights to a contested case hearing based upon hindsight.
4. Podsaid was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Interestingly, although the Board claims it took no action against Podsaid, the Board
contends in its argument on attorney fees that Podsaid failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
on the action it didn't take. Idaho Code§ 36-2114(b) allows a guide license applicant twenty-one
(21) days from the day of receiving notice of denial of a license application to submit a written
request for a hearing before the board to review such action. Podsaid requested the hearing, but
appealed before such hearing.
Typically, exhaustion of administrative remedies is required prior to filing an appeal.
However, a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately
reviewable ifreview of the final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy. LC.§ 675271(2).
The applicable legal standard in an appeal without exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been discussed in numerous cases. In Bohemian Breweries v. Koehler, 80 Idaho 438, 446448, 332 P.2d 875 (1958), this Court set forth the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
While as a general rnle administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort
is had to the courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts, such rule is not
absolute and will be departed from where the interests of justice so require, and the
rule does not apply unless the administrative agency acts within its authority.

*****
"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies affords no rigid rule
applicable indiscriminately in each and every situation where a party resorting to a
court has failed to exhaust an available administrative remedy, but is subject to
some limitations which, however, are not susceptible of exact definition. One line
12

of cases representing such a limitation on the doctrine turns on the nature of the
defect urged by a party as ground for judicial relief from action, threatened or
completed, by an administrative authority of first instance in the administrative
machinery; another line of cases turns on the futility of exhausting the
administrative remedy."
See also: Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557, 39 S.Ct. 375, 63
L.Ed. 772; Ogden City v. Armstrong, 168 U.S. 224, 18 S.Ct. 98, 42 L.Ed. 444.
In Grever v. Idaho Tel. Co., 94 Idaho 900, 499 P.2d 1256 (1972), this Court
further defined the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine: "In relaxing the doctrine of
exhaustion this Court held that the rule will be departed from under certain
circumstances, first, where the interests of justice so require and secondly, where the
agency acts outside its authority." Id. at 903, 499 P.2d at 1259; see also Bohemian

Breweries v. Koehler, 80 Idaho 438, 332 P.2d 875 (1958) (exhaustion of administrative
remedies not an absolute rule and will be departed from where the interests of justice so
require); Williams v. State, 95 Idaho 5, 501 P.2d 203 (1972) (deviation from rule
allowable when interests of justice would otherwise be thwarted).
This Court further expanded on this concept in Sierra Life Insurance Co. v. Granata, 99
Idaho 624,627, 586 P.2d 1068 (1978), holding:
It is difficult to find truly analogous cases dealing with the defense of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies because of (1) the extremely varied
nature of the administrative proceedings and remedies involved; (2) the variations
in the nature of the judicial relief or remedy sought which brings the judicial and
the administrative proceedings into conflict; and (3) the variations in the manner
in which the exhaustion doctrine defense is raised procedurally.

In the present case, Podsaid appealed without exhausting administrative remedies because
the agency conducted a contested case hearing outside the pending advertising contested case, and
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because the agency refused to treat his license as one of a continuing nature, and afford him the
rights he had as a holder of a license of a continuing nature.
Despite the Petitioner's clear request for renewal of his license, the agency deemed this
renewal application a new application. 440 R. p. 454. The Board was transparent in its reasoning
for deeming the application a new application rather than a renewal. First, the Board needed a
mechanism to avoid the stay issued in Shoshone County Case No. CV-08-807. In its letter to
Podsaid's counsel, the Board claimed:
The Board views this application as separate and distinct from Mr. Podsaid's
previous guide license with Darren Thome. The Board therefore believes this new
application is not affected by the stay entered by the Court in the judicial review
filed in Shoshone County, Case No. CV-08-0807.
440 R. p. 454.
Fmiher evidence that the agency made a conscious decision not to treat the license as one
of a continuing nature so it could avoid affording Podsaid his due process rights and a contested
case hearing on the advertising complaint is demonstrated by the following statements made by
the Board's prosecutor to the Board at the "licensing examination":
The rules are somewhat different. Generally, to kind of state the rules, if
it's a continuing application, let's say less scrutiny goes into it, and ce1iainly you
can't talk about things that have already been decided and they're over, like, for
example, all of the things that happened with Mr. Podsaid back in 2006, 2007, 2008.
He's already paid his price for that would be his argument. I'll talk about what
those things are in a minute. But having said that, you certainly can, even in a
continuing application situation, talk about new violations that are ongoing like the
Internet stuff. So that's why I'm giving you this - this memo.
AR. pp. 13-14 (Tr. p. 11. L. 25- p. 12. L. 1.)
It is clear the agency was aware it had to afford Podsaid his procedural due process rights in
the pending contested case and his statutory rights established in LC.§ 67-5254 if his guide license
was one of a continuing nature. It is equally clear from the above dialog the agency devised the
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"new application" argument to sidestep the procedural due process it owed Podsaid in the
contested case regarding the "new violations", avoid the district court's stay of the termination of
Podsaid's license, and avoid the procedural requirements of LC. § 67-5254.
Under these circumstances, justice requires that Podsaid be allowed to appeal the agency's
action without exhausting the administrative remedies available to a new guide applicant. The
agency was not acting within its authority. Further, it was futile to appeal the agency's decision
because it would not address the fundamental issue of whether the agency was acting outside its
statutory authority. An appeal without exhaustion was justified in this instance.
ATTORNEY FEES
On appeal, the Board claims this Court should not consider an award of attorney fees
because it acted in a reasonable basis given there is no case law interpreting this agency's
responsibilities under LC. § 67-5254. The Board contends its actions have not been unreasonable
given the lack of such case law. The Board maintains its decision not to treat Podsaid' s license as
one of a continuing nature was legitimate given the circumstances. The Board does not address
attorney fees related to Podsaid's appeal of the termination of his license based upon the agency's
interpretation of its own contract.
This brief and Podsaid's opening brief have discussed at length why the Board's actions
were not legitimate and valid. Regarding the 2008 case, the Board exceeded its statutory authority
by: (1) interpreting its own contract when no statute gave it such authority; and (2) terminating
Podsaid's issued license earlier than its issued expiration date without following the contested case
procedures.
Turning to the 2009 case, in Rincover v. State, Department ofFinance, l 32 Idaho 54 7, 54849, 976 P.2d 473, 474-75 (1999), this Court held that attorney fees need not be awarded when the
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agency's actions did not appear unreasonable under the circumstances. It expanding on that
concept, this court held "[w]e cannot say that the action by the Department was groundless or
arbitrary or required Wanda to bear an unfair or unjustified expense in an attempt through judicial
review to correct an agency mistake that should never have been made." Id.
The same can't be said in this case. The agency knew it had filed an administrative complaint
against Podsaid that required the administrative complaint be processed as a contested case under
the statute. Irrespective of whether Podsaid' s license was one of a continuing nature or not, the
agency knew it was required to process the pending administrative complaint as a contested case.
The agency knew it was utilizing a statute designed to establish a licensing examination procedure
to present the contested case to the Board. The motivation of the agency was to avoid affording
Podsaid the procedural protections afforded by due process and LC. § 67-5254. Unlike Rincover,
this case is not an honest misinterpretation of a statue. Rather, it involves the effmis of an agency
to operate outside the parameters of statutes that defined the actions it was to take. Podsaid has
had to bear an unfair financial burden to correct these actions, and to be afforded a proper contested
case hearing on a pending administrative complaint because of the agency's unreasonable action
of trying to adjudicate its administrative complaint without complying with LC. § 67-5254.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Board, as a creature of statute must follow the statutory rules and procedures that
govern its limited functions and powers. It failed in this case to do so. Podsaid's guide license was
unlawfully terminated and revoked when the Board amended its expiration date without
conducting a contested case. Likewise, Podsaid's statutory and constitutional rights were trampled
when his renewal application for his guide license, which he had held for over twenty years, was
treated as a new application rather than a renewal application. Even worse, Podsaid' s rights to due
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process were denied, and his statutory right to a contested case were ignored when the Board
adjudicated a pending contested case in a licensing examination proceeding.

It is respectfully

requested that the Court not affirm the agency's actions below.
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